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Abstract 
This paper examines effects of the formation of physical and human capital on the 
growth of labour productivity, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and wages in China, 
incorporating the market reform factors such as ownership shifts, population policy, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on education. We find that Chinese economic 
miracle is mainly pushed by the (physical) capital service rather than formation of 
human capital. The physical capital inputs contribute even more after 1994 as the 
returns to education decrease with the education expansion and increasing tuition fees. 
The traditional four economic regions of China show different growth patterns. The 
capital inputs mostly help the labour productivity growth in the West region and the 
wages growth in the Interior region, while human capital formation contributes to the 
TFP in all four regions. Moreover, provinces within each region present strong 
evidence of convergence of economic growth. The convergence is most prominent in 
the provinces within the Northeast and Coastal regions for labour productivity and 
TFP growth, suggesting fast technology spill-over within these regions.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper focuses on the regional disparities and convergence of economic growth 
with regions in China. China is one country with the worst regional economic 
disparities in the world (Yang, 2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Fleisher et al., 2010). 
We categorize the 28 administrative divisions (excluding Tibet) of China into four 
regions: the northeast region (including Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), the Coastal 
(including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
and Guangdong-Hainan), the Interior (Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and 
Hunan) and west (Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang).
1
 Table 1 presents the changes of 
labour productivity, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and wages among these four 
regions from 1978 to 2009.  
In 1978, the real GDP per worker of the Northeast was double that of the 
Coastal and the Interior. Then, the Coastal caught up with the Northeast with annual 
growth rate at 8.6 percent during 1978-1995. All regions developed very quickly at 
9.3 percent to 10 percent per year in 1995-2009. However, in 2009, the real labour 
productivity in the richer Northeast and Coastal regions (about 50,000 RMB) were 
still more than twice the poorer Interior and West regions (below 26,000 RMB) due to 
their low initial levels. A body of research has shown that TFP growth has played an 
important role in post-reform growth in China (Chow, 1993; Borensztein and Ostry, 
1996; Young, 2003; Wang and Yao, 2003; Islam et al., 2006; Fleisher et al., 2010). 
Table 1 shows that the Northeast had the higher level of TFP index (73) in 1978, 
nearly 17 percent higher than the Coastal, and 54 percent higher than the Interior and 
West. The annual growth rate of the TFP index was the highest in the Interior at 
annual rate of 4.4 percent from 1978 to 1995 and 3.9 percent from 1995 to 2009. 
Therefore, the TFP index of the Interior (173) exceeds the industrial Northeast region 
in 2009.  
In terms of wages, we find the same “gradualism, stagnation and sharp jumps” 
process of China’s economy as described in Fleisher et al. (2010). The gradualism of 
reform brings the slow pace of China’s transformation which distinguishes it from 
most other transition economies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union (Fleisher et al., 2005). In the 1980s, the regional wages were 
similar to each other due to a rigid labour market, until Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” 
in 1992 which speeds the pace of transition to a market based economy and changes 
the wage structure in China.
2
 From 1978 to 1995, the annual growth rates of wages in 
the Coastal (7.4 percent) were much higher than the other three regions, especially the 
Northeast (4.9 percent) which was suffering the huge laid-off from State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). During 1995-2009, wages increased rapidly with growing labour 
productivity in all regions at about 10-11 percent per year. With lower initial levels, 
average wages of the Coastal were about 10 percent higher than those of the Northeast 
in 2009, 22.6 percent higher than the Interior and 28.3 percent higher than the West. 
Therefore, if the increasing regional disparities in China were not corrected in time, 
the uneven growth in productivity and wages would not only threaten the ultimate 
                                                             
1 The division of the four regions is based on research regarding the major economic and geographical 
clusters in economic growth and development in China. See geographic graph of regions in Appendix 
Figure A1.  
2
 In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited the east region of China (Guangdong and Shanghai). His 
main idea was “To Get Rich Is Glorious”. Hence, we follow the same line of Fleisher et al. (2010) to 
account for the structural break of Chinese market reforms around 1994 in the specification of our 
empirical models.  
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success of China’s economic reform, but also bring about serious social and political 
unrest (Chen and Feng, 2000). Understanding the drivers of the increasing economic 
gap between the rich and poor regions and whether and how the poor regions are 
catching up with rich regions has become an urgent task for Chinese economists.
 
 
  
(Table 1 around here) 
 
Figure 1 also presents a preliminary statistical examination of regional 
disparities and convergence of labour productivity, TFP and wages. Here regional 
disparities are measured as the coefficients of variation (CV) of labour productivity 
(left axis), TFP and wages (right axis) among the four regions. Regional disparities 
have been decreasing for all three productivity proxies before 1986 which showed a 
common trend of convergence for all regions. After that, the coefficients of variation 
for labour productivity become quite stable, while the wages are dramatically 
diverging in the 1990s and then converging in the 2000s. In contrast to the diverging 
wages in the 1990s, TFP index keeps on converging among regions and becomes 
quite stable in the 2000s. Thus, these three productivity proxies show different 
convergence patterns in the more dynamic economy after 1986.   
 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
The different patterns of regional disparities of labour productivity, TFP and 
wages demand more comprehensive economic growth models which can take account 
of determining factors of economic growth such as demographic, social-economic and 
institutional changes. China need learn lessons from the economic growth path of 
developed economies. In a cross-country setting, numerous theoretical and empirical 
studies find that economic growth is determined by factors such as physical and 
human capital, privatization, international openness and public policy (Barro and Lee, 
1993; 2001; Chen and Feng, 1996; van Ark et al., 2008). However, effects of these 
determinants on Chinese economic growth, especially their impacts on different 
productivity proxies have not been thoroughly analysed. Thus, this paper aims to 
investigate determining factors in production processes, labour productivity, TFP and 
wages in China. We study the beta-convergence processes in China to check whether 
the lagging regions would grow faster than the rich regions and eventually catch up 
with them. We focus on the role of human capital in economic growth and address the 
associations between human capital formation and ownership reform, One-Child 
Policy, openness and fiscal expenditures.
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section is the literature review; in section 3 we lay out our baseline empirical 
specifications for drivers of regional disparity and beta-convergence; Section 4 is for 
data description; Section 5 reports empirical results; Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Regional convergence 
The hypothesis of economic convergence is a primary and particularly active area of 
research in empirical growth economics. The growth-convergence equation originates 
from the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956) and has been developed by long 
series of growth empirics such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In more recent 
literature, Byrne and Vecchi (2010) examine convergence in a panel of industries 
between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, providing evidence of 
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conditional convergence. When the partial correlation between economic growth and 
its initial level is negative, there is beta-convergence (Islam, 2003). 
Researchers generally deal with convergence in terms of GDP per capita across 
Chinese provinces. Jian et al. (1996) is a pioneering study proceeding from the 
neoclassical convergence and use the beta-convergence to analyze GDP per capita of 
28 Chinese provinces for the period 1978-1992. They use agriculture share and costal 
location as conditional variables and report that convergence before 1985 and 
divergence afterwards, which is consistent with what we find in Figure 3.1. They 
argue that convergence is a result of provinces in the Coastal (rural area) growing 
faster as a result of policy advantage.  
Raiser (1998) relies on light industry and investment rates as controlling 
variables and finds “weakening” convergence since 1985, which could be the result of 
either shifts in the steady state of some provinces in the Coastal or reduction in capital 
mobility. Chen and Fleisher (1996) find conditional convergence of production across 
provinces on physical investment share, employment growth, human capital 
investment, foreign direct investment (FDI) and coastal location from 1978 to 1993. 
Villaverde et al. (2010) find a strong convergence process for the periods 1978-1990 
and 2004-2007 but divergence for the period 1990-2004. They argue that provincial 
inequality in China mainly lies within rather between regions, particularly for 
provinces in the Coastal. 
Labour productivity convergence however can be the joint outcome of the twin 
processes of capital deepening and technological catch-up, known as issue of TFP 
convergence. Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978) initiates the international comparison 
of relative TFP levels in the United States and Japan during the period 1952-1974. 
Dollar and Wolff (1994) examine TFP level convergence using time-series growth 
accounting method, while Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) use a cross-section regression 
to interpret the coefficients of the initial income variables of the equation as indicative 
of TFP-convergence.  
Unfortunately, there is little literature about Chinese regional TFP convergence. 
As one of rare cases, Wu (2000) find that China’s regional TFP converges to the same 
level from 1982 to 1995 using coefficient of variation, but he does not relate his study 
to convergence theory. In this paper, we use the following conditional variables to 
analyze the drivers of regional disparities and beta-convergence of labour productivity, 
TFP and wages in China. 
 
2.2 Human capital  
It is widely hypothesized that human capital has an important role in production 
through the direct generation of worker skills and also facilitate technology spillovers 
(O'Mahony and Vecchi, 2009; Fleisher et al., 2010). Human capital plays a critical 
role in the endogenous growth models, which hold that knowledge-driven growth can 
lead to a constant or even increasing rate of return. Romer (1986; 1990) argues that 
human capital is the major input to research and development that innovates 
technologies. Levine and Renelt (1992) and Young (1992) also find that countries 
with larger initial human capital stock are more likely to have new products and grow 
faster than other countries. Empirical evidence has revealed a positive relationship 
between human capital and growth. Fleisher et al. (2010) find that human capital 
positively affects labour productivity, TFP growth and wage growth in China.  
This paper focuses on the effect of human capital on labour productivity, TFP 
and wages in China. Dearden et al. (2006), O’Mahony and Peng (2008) and 
Carmichael et al. (2009) compare the effect of education and training on productivity 
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and wages for European countries in an attempt to pick up external benefits of human 
capital. However, China does not have the labour force survey dataset for the whole 
country, so we apply the labour composition index into an economic growth model 
and address the associations between human capital formation and ownership reform, 
One-Child Policy, openness and fiscal expenditures.
 
 
 
2.3 Physical capital 
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that an augmented Solow model including physical capital 
as well as human capital accumulation can describe the cross-country data. Bai et al. 
(2006) estimate average rates of returns on physical capital for Chinese industrial 
enterprises as 6.1 percent in 1998 and 12.2 percent in 2003. Ding and Knight (2011) 
verifies that China’s exceptional growth performance is most fundamentally a 
reflection of the high investment rates of physical and human capital that 
characterised the economy. 
 
2.4 Ownership reform 
Knight and Song (2001) point out that there are two obvious explanations for the rise 
in regional disparity in China: economic growth and policies of economic reforms. 
The Chinese economy has experienced dramatic institutional reforms in last thirty 
years (Chen and Feng, 2000). Although urban economic reforms began in the period 
of 1983-85, the Chinese economy was still largely a command and market 
coordinated economy with rigid wage system over the entire period of our study.
 3
 
The State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) account for more than half of gross industrial 
outputs (Fleisher et al., 2010).
 
 
After 1992, Chinese reforms aimed to transform the rigid central-planned 
economy into a flexible market-oriented economy. Chen and Feng (2000) suggest that 
a larger share of production by non-state-owned enterprises (including collective and 
private units) results in higher economic growth in the Coastal region of China.
4
 
Consequently, curtailing the widening Coastal-Inner regional gaps can be effectively 
achieved by promoting collective-owned or private enterprises.  
Fleisher et al. (2010) measure the degree of market reform in the local economy 
using the proportion of urban labour employed in private firms. We categorize staff 
and workers into three kinds of enterprises: SOEs, collective-owned units and private 
units, and assess the effect of privatization on labour productivity, TFP and wages. 
Under the rigid wage system until the early 1990s, the superior labour compensation 
in joint ventures and foreign firms attracted many talented workers to transfer from 
SOEs into the private sector which was well known as “jumping into the sea”. It 
brought about a much more efficient allocation of human capital in the production 
processes. 
However, the wages in the public sector began to increase sharply in the late 
1990s and reached 16,227 Yuan in 2003 which finally surpassed the private sector 
wages and attracted Chinese professionals back to the public sector known as 
“coming back to shore” (Yang et al., 2010). These new changes could be from the 
                                                             
3
 Using data for advanced European countries such as Germany and Italy, Peng and Siebert (2007; 2008) 
find that the wage rigidity harms the economy of lagging regions by delaying their recovery from 
disadvantageous shocks. Kang and Peng (2012) analyze the CHNS data and also find similar wage 
rigidity for lagging private sector in China. 
4 “Private units” include cooperative enterprises, Joint enterprises, Limited liability enterprises, 
share-holding enterprises, private enterprises, self-employed individual, Funds from Hong Kong, Macro 
and Taiwan, Foreign funded enterprises. 
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capital deepening processes through the global value chain which make the economic 
scale more important than before and also improve human capital formation. 
Therefore, the ownership structure is a very important institutional factor in our study.  
 
2.5 Openness 
Levine and Renelt (1992) systematically study numerous economic factors that may 
account for long-run aggregate economic growth. They argue that government 
policies reducing protectionism and liberalising trade are major inputs for growth. 
Chen and Feng (2000) also argue that international trade is encouraged by 
geographical and political factors such as proximity to major ports, decisions to create 
special economic zones and free trade areas, local institutional characteristics such as 
laws and regulations, contract enforcement, local expenditures on infrastructure, and 
by labour market conditions. Trade also has facilitated the transformation of the 
state-owned and the collective sectors, and potentially bring in new production and 
managerial technologies with their attendant spill-overs (Liu, 2008; O'Mahony et al., 
2008). Thus, we also account for the regional disparity with trade by measuring an 
openness variable as the share of international trade (export and import) to GDP, and 
assess its effect on regional productivity and wages. 
 
2.6 One-Child Policy 
Birth rate is regarded as an important variable representing human capital formation 
in the productivity model, but no conclusion that birth rate has positive or negative 
effect on productivity in the theoretical or empirical literatures. On the one hand, there 
is “population pessimism” which claims population growth will bring negative effect 
on economic growth. Malthus (1798 [1986]) claimed that large population will 
decrease the productivity because of diminishing marginal productivity. For a natural 
resource (land, water, etc.) augmented economy, such as rural economy, as population 
grows the per capita share of natural resource decreases. Hence, the marginal product 
of labour goes down.  
On the other hand, there is “population optimism” which claims population 
growth will bring positive effect on economic growth. The neo-Boserupian school of 
thought (Boserup, 1981) mentions that population may have a scale effect that is 
beneficial to economic growth. Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) argue that in 
modern urban economies with small agricultural and natural-resource sectors, the 
increased density that comes with higher population and greater urbanization 
promotes specialization and investment in human capital and more rapid 
accumulation of new knowledge, which would raise per capita incomes.  
Thus, Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) combine both negative effect 
(diminishing marginal productivity) and the positive effect (human capital 
accumulation, spill-over effect, etc.) and conclude that “the net relation between 
greater population and labour productivity depends on whether the inducements to 
human capital and expansion of knowledge are stronger than diminishing returns to 
natural resources. China started the “One-Child Policy” in 1979 which only be 
applied to the Han Chinese
5
 and by way of affirmative policies, all ethnic minorities 
in China are allowed to have two or more children until the end of the 1980s (Qian, 
1997). In this paper, I will study the net effect of birth rate on labour productivity, 
Total factor productivity and average wages in the transition of rural economy to 
                                                             
5 
Han Chinese is an ethnic group native to China and constitutes about 92 percent of the population of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
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urban economy by urbanization reform.  
 
2.7 Regional growth policies 
The cross-country growth literature addresses the political roles that the central 
government can play in improving the lagging regions’ economic growth. Since the 
widening productivity and wage gap between the Coastal and the other regions can 
lead to political unrest and polarization, the Chinese central government has 
emphasized the importance of the inner areas’ growth and development.  
Ma (1995), Ma and Norregaard (1998) and Chen and Feng (2000) argue that the 
central government policies should not be biased in favour of the Coastal. The central 
government led by Premier Zhu Rongji launched the “Western Development Strategy” 
in 1999 to boost the lagging Interior and West regions. The main components of the 
strategies include the development of infrastructure, enticement of foreign investment, 
increased efforts on ecological protection (such as reforestation), as well as human 
capital formation such as promotion of education and retention of talent flowing to 
richer provinces. As of 2006, a total of 1 trillion Yuan has been spent on building 
infrastructure in western China (Goodman, 2004).  
Moreover, the Northeast was one of the earlier regions to industrialize in China, 
focusing mainly on equipment manufacturing including the steel, automobile, 
shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, and petroleum refining industries. Recent years, 
however, have seen the stagnation of the Northeast’s heavy-industry-based economy, 
as economy continues to liberalize and privatize. Hence, the central government led 
by Premier Wen JiaBao has initialized the “Revitalize the Northeast” campaign in 
2003.  These policy factors should be considered in an economic growth model for 
China by the sensitivity test of different development patterns of the four regions. 
 
2.8 Fiscal expenditures on human capital 
Not only individuals but also government benefit from increasing wages. Heckman 
(2005) notes that China’s government investment in human capital beyond the junior 
high school level (the compulsory 9-year education) has been very small and 
dispersed, in contrast to nations at similar levels of socio-economic development. 
Chinese government has increased education expenditures sharply aiming for 4 
percent of GDP before 2010. In 2007, however, the government expenditures on 
education are still only 2.43 percent of GDP and have been below 3 percent in most 
years since 1992, which are much lower than the average of 5.1 percent in developed 
countries (Fleisher et al., 2010). Hence, we investigate the effect of provincial “fiscal 
expenditures on human capital (culture, education, scientific and health)” on labour 
productivity, TFP and wages.  
 
2.9 Structural breaks in 1994 
The year 1994 marks the fiscal decentralization processes beginning from withdrawal 
of government subsidies for loss-incurring SOEs, and the hardening of SOEs’ budget 
constraints become much more earnest in 1997 (Appleton et al., 2002).
6
 The shift 
toward fiscal federalism is also through separating central and local government 
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 The decentralization of fiscal revenue raising and spending decisions can improve the efficiency of the 
public sector, cut the budget deficit and promote economic growth because local governments are better 
positioned than the central government to locate and monitor the fiscal expenditure more efficiently, 
which reinforced imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Ma and 
Norregaard, 1998; Oates, 1972). It is also confirmed by numerous studies on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in China (Agarwala, 1992).  
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taxation and relaxing ties between provincial and sub-provincial treasuries and the 
centre, reinforced imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Su and Zhao, 2004). 
Therefore, We will follow the suggestion of Fleisher et al. (2010) to use the year 1994 
as a structural break for the economic transition process in China.  
 
3. Empirical specifications 
3.1 Baseline empirical Specifications 
First, we estimate a regional aggregate production function, in which inputs include 
physical and human capital. We measure human capital as the composition-adjusted 
labour inputs (= Number of employed persons * LCI
7
 ). The standard regional fixed 
effects (FE) specification is as follows: 
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where Ypt is the real GDP for province p (=1 ,…, 28) in year t ( =1978, …, 2009); Kpt 
is real capital inputs; Lpt is the number of employed persons; LCIpt is the labour 
composition index calculated with the micro CHNS dataset; Rr and Tt are region 
(=1,…,4) and time dummies; and εit is a random error term. We apply two sensitivity 
tests for the 1994 structural break, and the disparity in different development patterns 
in the four regions: 1) Adding variables interacted with the structural break year 
dummy Spt (0 = before 1994, 1 = 1994 and thereafter); 2) Adding variables interacted 
with the regional dummies rd  to capture the different growth paths of regions. The 
rd1 – rd3 dummies are for the Northeast, Coastal and Interior regions, leaving the 
West as the baseline region. Hence, the coefficients of interactions are the incremental 
effect of specific period/region on the baseline period/region. 
 
 
Second, the fixed effect (FE) models are applied to examine the impact of LCI 
and institutional variables on labour productivity, TFP and wages. We present the 
basic FE specification as follows: 
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where LPpt is the GDP per worker for province p in year t; KLpt is real capital stock 
per worker; TFPpt is the total factor productivity index; AWpt is the real annual 
earnings per worker; O1pt and O3pt represent the ratios of staff and workers worked in 
the public sector and private enterprises respectively; BRpt is the birth rate of 
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 The Labour composition index for 1989 – 2009 used in this paper is calculated from Kang et al. (2012).  
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population to measure the human capital formation from One-Child Policy on 
productivity; OPpt is the share of trade (export and import) of GDP to capture the 
effect of openness and potential skilled-biased technology spill-overs; Fispt 
is the 
share of fiscal expenditures on human capital; Rr and Tt are region and time dummies; 
and
 
εpt is a random error term.  
Following the same vein of the sensitivity tests in the production function in 
equation (2.1), we also apply sensitivity tests for structural break (year 1994) in 
labour productivity as follows (the regressions in TFP and wage functions are 
similar): 
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And the sensitivity tests for regional disparities in labour productivity are just 
replacing the structural break dummy with the regional dummies rd1-rd3 for the 
Northeast, Coastal and Interior regions.  
 
3.2 Empirical specifications for beta-convergence 
Following Sala-i-Martin (1996), we postulate that beta-convergence holds for 
provinces p in a region. Log form labour productivity in the province p can be 
approximated by   
 
pttppt LPLP   1,ln)1(ln                       (4) 
 
where 0<  <1 and ),0(~ 2 pt , and is independent over province p and year t. 
Manipulating the equation (4) yields, 
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Thus,  >0 implies a negative correlation between growth and initial level of labour 
productivity. 
 
)1( Te                                 (6) 
        
λ is the measure of speed at which a region proceeds towards its own steady state 
level, Hence, λ from cross-section data is often interpreted as the speed at which 
poorer regions are closing their productivity gap with richer countries.  
The beta-convergence regression of provincial labour productivity for region r 
(=1, … ,4) are as follows: 
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where LPp,t-1 is the lagged labour productivity for province p. The beta-convergence 
regression of provincial TFP and wages for region r are similarly as follows: 
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4. Data Description 
Table 2 describes the variables used in this paper. In 1978, the real GDP in the 
Northeast (51.2 billion RMB) is higher than that of the Coastal (48 billion RMB) and 
Interior (39.1 billion RMB), and above twice that of the West (22.5 billion RMB). 
Hence, the industrial Northeast was the growth engine and the richest region. From 
1978 to 1994, the GDP in the Coastal increases about 6 fold, compared with about 4 
fold in the other three regions so that the Coastal took the No.1 position of the 
Northeast gradually. From 1994 to 2009, all regions increase 5 fold, suggesting a 
convergence trend among regions. Hence, over the last 32 years, the Coastal has the 
highest annual growth rate of GDP at 11.9 percent, while the Northeast grows slower 
than the Coastal at 8.7 percent per year.  
The capital inputs have the similar pattern to GDP. The Northeast had the 
highest capital inputs (65 billion RMB) in 1978. Then, the capital inputs in the 
Coastal increased rapidly so that they were 50 percent higher than the Northeast in 
2009. The annual growth rate is the highest in the Coastal (14.2 percent) and lowest in 
the Northeast (10.9 percent). TFP index has been increasing in all four regions, but the 
growth is most prominent in the Interior. TFP index in the Interior (50) was the lowest 
among the four regions in 1978 which increased to 94 in 1994, and finally achieved 
the second highest level (173) among four regions in 2009. As average wage rates are 
concerned, the Coastal has the lowest wages (1,766 Yuan, about 211 US$ in 1995) 
among the four regions in 1978. However, its growth rate was the fastest at 8.6 
percent per year and increased 16 fold from 1978 to 2009. Hence, the average wages 
of the Coastal (27,697 Yuan, about 4,054 US$) became the highest among the four 
regions in 2009. The labour composition index is normally higher in the Interior than 
in the other three regions, which may be because the Interior is closer to the municipal 
cities with rich education resources, such as Beijing and Shanghai (see more details in 
Appendix Table A1).  
We also compare several relevant factors that may affect growth, such as 
ownership (the share of persons employed in SOEs or private enterprises), birth rate, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on human capital. First of all, the share of private 
enterprise has been increasing over time, and now is higher than SOEs in the Coastal 
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(88 percent). In 1978, all four regions had a share of SOEs more than 70 percent (86 
percent in the West). Thereafter, the SOEs share of staff employed persons has 
declined to the range of 16-24 percent in the three inner regions and even lower in the 
Coastal (only 11 percent) in 2009.  
The birth rate keeps on decreasing for all regions resulting from the One-Child 
Policy, and in 2009, the Northeast had the lowest birth rate (7.07‰) while the West 
had the highest rate (12.75‰). The provinces in the Coastal tend to be more engaged 
in international trade because of their geographic, historical and institutional 
advantages, while inner provinces tend to be less open to international trade. The 
openness ratio (5 percent) in the Coastal was much higher than the second most open 
region - the Northeast (2 percent) in 1978. From 1994, the openness ratios were quite 
stable in the four regions: the Coastal (9 percent), the Northeast (3 percent) and the 
other two lagging regions (1 percent). As noted above, the openness of these 
provinces in the Coastal is likely to be an important factor conducive to higher 
growth. 
Finally, the proportion of fiscal expenditures on human capital in the Interior 
was the highest among the four regions in 1978 (18 percent), as the other regions are 
nearly the same (16 percent). Human capital expenditures have been increasing very 
fast in both absolute and relative sense over the period 1978-1994. The West region 
even achieved a peak proportion as 59 percent in 1994 because the central 
government transfer huge investment on human capital to the Xinjiang province of the 
West region. After 1994, this expenditures share slowly has been decreasing in all 
regions, possibly due to the dramatic process of fiscal decentralization in 1994, 
possible due to the substitution effect of infrastructural investment of local 
government (Fleisher et al., 2010; Zhang and Zou, 1998).   
 
(Table 2 around here) 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1 Results of baseline regressions 
This section reports statistical results estimating cross-region productivity and wages 
from 1978 to 2009 in China. Table 3 presents the estimation results from the simple 
production function using equation (1). The estimated output elasticises of capital 
services, adjusted labour inputs are positive and significant, which is consistent with 
the literature. For the overall regression (1), the contribution of adjusted labour inputs 
is slightly higher than capital services.  
For the sensitivity test on structural break in 1994, regression (2) shows that 
significantly positive incremental effect in physical capital (14.7 percent) and 
significantly negative incremental effect in adjusted labour inputs (-12.9 percent), 
confirming the structural break in China’s economy in 1994. Regression (3) shows the 
sensitivity tests on regional heterogeneity that the adjusted labour inputs mainly 
benefits output in the West (1.14) and the Interior (0.785), while the capital inputs are 
more important in the Northeast (0.81) and the Coastal (0.69) than others.  
 
(Table 3 around here) 
 
Table 4 displays estimation results of the baseline specification for effect of 
human capital on labour productivity, TFP and wages. We find that capital deepening 
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improves labour productivity and wages. The labour composition index improves all 
three productivity proxies and benefits workers’ earnings (3.6 percent) more than TFP 
(3 percent) and labour productivity (1.1 percent).  
Other variables include the market reform factors such as ownership, birth rate, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on human capital. Compared to collective-owned 
enterprises, the private firms have much higher productivity and wages; while the 
public sector has lower productivity but similar wages. The birth rate is negatively 
associated with the three productivity proxies, which is consistent with Li and Zhang 
(2007). Openness can increase TFP (45 percent) and the labour productivity (29 
percent), but not for wages. Fiscal expenditures on human capital have no significant 
effect on the labour productivity and TFP, but decrease wage (-12.4 percent).  
We conclude that capital deepening as well as human capital formation, 
privatization and openness significantly improve economic growth, while higher birth 
rate and the relatively inefficient public sectors harm productivity growth. Fiscal 
expenditures on human capital have no significant positive effect on economic growth, 
and are even harmful for wages, verifying Zhang and Zou (1998)’s argument that 
central government spending (such as in highways, railways, power stations, 
telecommunications and energy)  benefits economic growth, while a high degree of 
provincial government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth. 
 
(Table 4 around here) 
 
As the dramatic fiscal reform happens during in 1994, we argue that the 
structural break may produce biases in our estimation. Hence, we next have the 
sensitivity tests on disparities in the two time periods (1978-1993 and 1994-2009) and 
four regions using the equation (3). The results are reported in Table 5 and 6. In Table 
5, economic growth mainly benefits from the capital services (48 percent) and 
openness (33 percent) before 1994, but mainly from the birth rate (1.642), the capital 
inputs (60.5 percent) and the fiscal expenditures on human capital (12.8 percent) after 
1994. The public sector harms labour productivity overall for the whole time period, 
but it improves TFP and wages after 1994. These results confirm our postulation on 
structural break in 1994. Especially for fiscal expenditures on human capital, the 
positive effect on productivity is found after 1994, as well as positive effect on wages 
before 1994. 
Openness has significantly positive effect on labour productivity and TFP.  The 
LCI accelerate both TFP and wage growth from 1978 to 2009. Among other variables, 
the privatization is the most important institutional change for the three productivity 
proxies after 1994.  
Since the One-Child Policy was implemented after late 1970s, people who born 
under this policy have not join the labour market before 1994, supporting the negative 
effect of birth rate on labour productivity due to the dominant diminishing marginal 
productivity. However, after 1994, the birth rate has positive effect on labour 
productivity due to the human capital accumulation in the One-Child family, the 
development of urban area and the gradual process of urbanization. For the whole 
time period 1978-2009, the birth rate has negative effect on TFP mainly due to the 
still low technology level across the population. The effects of birth rate on labour 
productivity and average wages are inconsistent, maybe because Chinese labour 
market is still rigid in the transition process. Overall, this table shows that the 
post-1994 period is different from the pre-1994, supporting that year 1994 is a 
structural break year for Chinese productivity analysis.  
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(Table 5 around here) 
 
Table 6 shows the different growth patterns for the four regions. Capital 
accumulation benefits the labour productivity and TFP growth in all four regions, 
especially in the Northeast and Interior. The labour composition index is more 
important in the Coastal, mainly possibly due to 56 percent of top universities in 
China are located in this region (see Appendix Table A1). The public sector only 
improves labour productivity and TFP in the Northeast and Coastal, and wages in the 
Interior. The Northeast and Coastal also benefit from more private firms. The birth 
rate has no effect on labour productivity, but harms the TFP in all the four regions 
which is consistent with quality and quantity argument of human capital formation. 
Openness has huge positive effect on all three productivity proxies, except in the 
Northeast for the labour productivity, and in the Coastal for wages. The fiscal 
expenditures on human capital are also significantly positive in the Coastal for wages, 
suggesting a new growth pattern in this advanced region.  
 
(Table 6 around here) 
 
5.2 Results of beta-convergence regressions 
Table 7 presents estimation results for conditional beta-divergence. The dependent 
variables are growth rates of labour productivity, TFP or average wages. We control 
relevant condition variables such as capital deepening, LCI, ownership, birth rate, 
openness, fiscal expenditures on human capital and structural break in year 1994 as 
above. The conditional beta-convergence is present if the coefficient on lagged 
dependent variable is significantly less than 0.  
The main difference between the OLS and GLS specifications appears on the 
coefficients of the controlled variables. For example, regarding to the labour 
productivity regressions, GLS method finds upwards bias of OLS estimators on 
capital deepening and ownership variables, and GLS method verify the significant 
positive effect of LCI on labour productivity in the Interior region which is consistent 
with our discuss about LCI indices.  
The convergence speeds are similar in the two specifications, and both methods 
confirm that only provincial within the Northeast region do not show evidence of 
convergence for average wages. The provinces within the richest Northeast and Costal 
regions have the highest speed (above 2) converging to their steady states of labour 
productivity and TFP growth, while the provinces within the poorest West region have 
the lowest convergence speed (1.89). For the convergence trends of average wages, 
the provinces within the Coastal regions still have highest speed (2.03) while the 
provinces within the West region has the lowest speed (1.99). From the convergence 
analyse, we can see that the poorest West region not only suffer from the severe 
regional inequality, but also suffer from the relative slower convergence speed across 
provinces within this region.  
 
(Table 7 around here) 
 
6. Conclusions 
China’s spectacular economic growth is from unequal economic performance of 
provinces and regions. This paper examines effects of the formation of physical and 
human capital on labour productivity, Total factor productivity (TFP) and wages 
14 
 
incorporating the market reform factors such as ownership shift, population policy, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on education. We find that, in a simple production 
function, the human capital (measured as composition-adjusted labour inputs) is more 
important than physical capital for GDP. And, the returns to adjusted labour inputs in 
the West which has the poorest education resources are the highest among the four 
regions, while the returns to capital inputs are the highest in the traditional industrial 
Northeast region.  
In more accurate specifications for labour productivity, TFP and wages, Chinese 
economic miracle mainly pushed by the (physical) capital service per capita rather 
than labour composition index, possibly due to that the effect of human capital has 
been reflected into market reform variables such as privatization, One-Child Policy, 
openness, and fiscal expenditures on human capital. The share of persons employed in 
the private sector and openness (competing with the foreign companies to the 
globalization processes) are very important for labour productivity and TFP growth, 
which allow a more efficient allocation of human capital based on market demand 
rather than central planning. The higher birth rate is harmful for human capital 
formation within the families and negative for productivity. The average wage rate is 
harmed by the fiscal expenditures on human capital, possible due to the substitution 
effect of infrastructural investment of local government (Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
The structural break between the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods illustrates 
significant difference on economic growth patterns, indicating that the more radical 
market reforms after 1994 improve productivity and wages. The capital inputs 
contribute more after 1994, while the returns to Labour composition index (LCI) 
decrease with the education expansion and increasing tuition fees since the late 1990s 
(Wang et al., 2010). 
The four regions also show different patterns in economic growth paths. The 
capital inputs mostly help the labour productivity growth in the West as well as the 
wages growth in the Interior. LCI contributes to the TFP in all four regions. The 
privatization processes improve labour productivity and TFP in the Northeast and 
Coastal, as well as wage growth in all four regions except the West. The collective 
ownership seems a better choice than the pure private or public organisation for the 
West because its economy is still based on agriculture. Openness is good for three 
productivity proxies in all four regions, except labour productivity in the Northeast 
and wages in the Coastal. It is consistent with two phenomenal economic issues in 
China: the declining production power of the Northeast under the international and 
internal competition and the great migration of unskilled workers from the rural areas 
around the country to the coastal region after 1994.  
Moreover, provinces within each region present strong evidence of 
beta-convergence for all three productivity proxies. The highest convergence speed is 
found in the provinces in the Northeast and Coastal regions for labour productivity 
and TFP growth, suggesting fast technology spill-over within these regions. The 
provinces in the Coastal, as the most advanced region in China have the highest 
convergence speed for average wages, while the provinces in the Northeast region do 
not show convergence in both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) regressions. 
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Figure 1: Coefficients of variation, 1978-2009 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999); various years China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 1999); National 
Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
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Table 1 Changes of labour productivity, TFP and wages, 1978- 2009 
 
 
Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Real labour productivity 
1978 value 5288 2964 2115 1993 
1995 value 12263 12766 6637 5905 
2009 value 49728 48818 25657 21644 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.049 0.086 0.067 0.064 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.100 0.096 0.097 0.093 
Total factor productivity index (1995=100) 
1978 value 73 63 47 50 
1995 value 100 100 100 100 
2009 value 170 166 173 165 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.018 0.028 0.044 0.040 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.036 
Real average annual wages 
1978 value 2162 1773 1812 1999 
1995 value 4541 6266 4555 4801 
2009 value 22431 24662 20116 19222 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.044 0.074 0.054 0.052 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.114 0.098 0.106 0.099 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999)); various years China Statistical Yearbook; National Bureau of 
Statistics (1999). 
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Table 2: Data description of economic growth in China 
Region GDP 
Capital 
input 
Labour 
input 
TFP 
index 
Average 
wage 
Labour 
composition 
index 
Public 
sector  
Private 
Firms 
Birth 
rate 
( ‰) Openness 
Fiscal 
expenditures 
on human 
capital 
  1978 
Northeast 512 650 969 70 2148 101.64 0.78 0 16.93 0.02 0.16 
Coastal 480 377 1620 71 1766 101.37 0.74 0 17.63 0.05 0.16 
Interior 391 509 1848 50 1786 102.50 0.81 0 20.19 0.01 0.18 
West 225 308 1127 54 2147 100.92 0.86 0 22.75 0.01 0.15 
  1994 
Northeast 1825 3030 1592 96 4128 101.39 0.47 0.37 11.46 0.03 0.27 
Coastal 2866 4353 2445 96 5646 101.66 0.35 0.54 12.66 0.08 0.3 
Interior 1751 2324 2929 94 4059 103.23 0.36 0.55 16.83 0.01 0.31 
West 953 1329 1793 94 4521 101.24 0.53 0.37 20.04 0.02 0.59 
  2009 
Northeast 8391 21113 1687 178 21919 103.90 0.24 0.75 7.07 0.03 0.24 
Coastal 15538 35817 3183 167 27697 104.36 0.11 0.88 10.38 0.09 0.29 
Interior 8729 21366 3402 173 19799 108.82 0.16 0.82 11.97 0.01 0.27 
West 4474 12707 2067 170 18632 104.10 0.22 0.77 12.75 0.01 0.25 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999); various years China Statistical Yearbook; National Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
 
Notes: 
1. “GDP”: 100 million Yuan. “Capital input”: 100 million Yuan. “Labour input”: Number of employed persons, 10,000 persons. “TFP index”, “Labour composition 
index”: 1995=100. Average wage: annual wage rate (Yuan per worker).  
2. The value of the labour composition index in 1978 is assumed to equal those in 1989, since the LCI is calculated by the Chinese Household Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) (1989-2009). 
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Table 3:  Production function and sensitivity tests, fixed effect model using equation (1) 
  Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3)  
Dep. Variable:  
Ln (GDP) 
Overall 
effect 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incremental) 
Northeast 
(Incremental) 
Coastal 
(Incremental) 
Interior 
(Incremental) 
West 
Ln (Capital) 0.681*** 0.510*** 0.147*** 0.213*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.599*** 
0.007 0.011 0.01 0.029 0.02 0.026 0.018 
Ln (adjusted 
labour input) 
0.696*** 0.998*** -0.129*** -0.905*** -0.563*** -0.355**  1.140*** 
0.044 0.043 0.01 0.175 0.126 0.148 0.111 
R-squared 0.986 0.991 0.987 
N 832 832 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
Significant coefficients table: 
 Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3) 
Dep. Variable: Ln (GDP) Overall effect Before 1994 After 1994 Northeast  Coastal Interior  West  
Ln (Capital) 0.681 0.51 0.657 0.812 0.69 0.679 0.599 
Ln (Adjusted labour input) 0.696 0.998 0.869 0.235 0.577 0.785 1.14 
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Table 4: Baseline model, fixed effect models using equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), 
1978-2009   
Dependent variable 
Ln (Labour 
productivity) 
Ln (TFP 
index) 
Ln (Average 
wage) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.564***   0.568*** 
 
0.01   0.01 
Labour composition index 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public sector (%) -0.343*** -0.498*** 0.19 
 
0.12 0.15 0.17 
Private sector (%) 0.296*** 0.515*** 0.547*** 
 
0.10 0.11 0.14 
Birth rate -3.505*** -5.585*** -0.87 
 
1.04 1.28 1.49 
Openness 0.290** 0.446*** -0.17 
 
0.14 0.16 0.19 
Fiscal expenditures on  
human capital 
-0.05 -0.03 -0.124*** 
  0.03 0.04 0.05 
R-squared 0.99 0.89 0.97 
N 832 832 832 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
Significant coefficients table 
Dependent variable 
Ln (Labour 
productivity) 
Ln (TFP 
index) 
Ln (Average 
wage) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.56   0.57 
Labour composition index 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Public sector (%) -0.34 -0.50 - 
Private sector (%) 0.30 0.52 0.55 
birth rate -3.51 -5.59 - 
Openness 0.29 0.45 - 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
- - -0.12 
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Table 5: Sensitivity tests for structural break (Y1994), fixed effect models using 
equation (3), 1978-2009  
              
Dependent variable Log (Labour 
productivity) 
Log (TFP index) Log (Average wage) 
 Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.483*** 0.122***   
 
0.383*** 0.223*** 
 
0.01 0.01   
 
0.01 0.01 
Labour composition 
index 
0.01 0.00 0.034*** -0.012*** 0.033*** -0.016*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public sector (%) -0.595*** -0.06 -0.554*** 1.145*** -0.20 1.911*** 
 
0.12 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.32 
Private sector (%) 0.13 0.17 0.309** 1.375*** 0.404*** 1.847*** 
 
0.10 0.22 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.26 
birth rate -4.763*** 6.405*** -6.906*** 6.067*** 2.275* -4.666** 
 
1.11 1.90 1.42 2.20 1.31 2.23 
Openness 0.327** -0.298** 0.549*** -0.421*** -0.11 -0.524*** 
 
0.14 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Fiscal expenditures on 
human capital 
-0.07 0.128** -0.135** 0.196*** 0.155*** -0.182*** 
  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
R-squared 0.99 0.90 0.98 
N 832 832 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
Significant coefficients table             
Dependent variable 
Log (GDP per 
worker) Log (TFP index) 
Log (Average 
wage) 
  
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.48 0.61   
 
0.38 0.61 
Labour composition index 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Public sector (%) -0.60 -0.60 -0.55 0.59 - 1.91 
Private sector (%) - - 0.31 1.68 0.40 2.25 
birth rate  -4.76 1.64 -6.91 -0.84 2.28 -2.39 
Openness 0.33 0.03 0.55 0.13 - -0.52 
Fiscal expenditures  
on human capital 
- 0.13 -0.14 0.06 0.16 -0.03 
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Table 6: Sensitivity tests for 4 regions, fixed effect models, 1978-2009 
          
Dependent variable Ln (Labour productivity) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.028 -0.053* 0.029 0.568*** 
 
0.048 0.028 0.032 0.025 
Labour composition index 0.017 0.035*** 0.003 0.008 
 
0.017 0.011 0.01 0.009 
Public sector (%) 2.336*** 1.954*** 0.319 -2.350*** 
 
0.647 0.346 0.452 0.314 
Private sector (%) 1.985*** 1.748*** 0.365 -1.395*** 
 
0.419 0.278 0.353 0.253 
birth rate -0.55 -3.891 2.779 -2.924 
 
3.525 2.537 3.237 2.199 
Openness -4.895*** -4.430*** -2.856 4.583*** 
 
1.314 1.219 1.956 1.211 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.275 -0.173 0.069 0.017 
  0.309 0.121 0.196 0.031 
R-squared 0.989 
N 832 
Dependent variable Ln (TFP index) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Labour composition index -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 0.037*** 
 
0.02 0.012 0.011 0.01 
Public sector (%) 1.618** 2.581*** -0.26 -2.459*** 
 
0.811 0.456 0.597 0.415 
Private sector (%) 1.544*** 1.943*** 0.04 -1.071*** 
 
0.551 0.357 0.462 0.33 
birth rate 5.23 -2.324 6.579 -6.969** 
 
4.488 3.317 4.25 2.871 
Openness -3.654** -4.485*** -0.502 4.912*** 
 
1.699 1.57 2.469 1.56 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.773* -0.553*** -0.42 0.044 
  0.407 0.153 0.257 0.04 
R-squared 0.904 
N 832 
Dependent variable Ln (Average wage) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Ln (Capital per worker) -0.022 -0.039 0.118** 0.538*** 
 
0.072 0.043 0.049 0.038 
Labour composition index 0.034 0.037** -0.02 0.047*** 
 
0.026 0.016 0.015 0.014 
Public sector (%) 0.946 0.772 2.162*** -1.395*** 
 
0.969 0.519 0.678 0.471 
Private sector (%) 1.415** 0.924** 1.559*** -0.812** 
 
0.628 0.417 0.529 0.379 
birth rate 7.386 4.967 4.267 -5.336 
 
5.281 3.801 4.849 3.295 
Openness -3.238 -3.515* -0.399 3.356* 
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1.969 1.826 2.931 1.815 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.781* 0.404** -0.193 -0.077* 
  0.463 0.181 0.293 0.046 
R-squared 0.974 
N 832 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
Significant coefficients table: 
  Northeast Coastal Interior  West  
Dependent variable Ln (Labour productivity) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.568 0.515 0.568 0.57 
Labour composition index - 0.035 - - 
Public sector (%) -0.014 -0.396 -2.35 -2.35 
Private sector (%) 0.59 0.353 -1.395 -1.40 
birth rate - - - - 
Openness -0.312 0.153 4.583 4.58 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital - - - - 
Dependent variable Ln (TFP index) 
Labour composition index 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.04 
Public sector (%) -0.841 0.122 -2.459 -2.46 
Private sector (%) 0.473 0.872 -1.071 -1.07 
birth rate -6.969 -6.969 -6.969 -6.97 
Openness 1.258 0.427 4.912 4.91 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.773 -0.553 - - 
Dependent variable           Ln(Average wage)   
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.538 0.499 0.656 0.54 
Labour composition index 0.047 0.084 0.047 0.05 
Public sector (%) -1.395 -1.395 0.767 -1.40 
Private sector (%) 0.603 0.112 0.747 -0.81 
birth rate 7.386 - - - 
Openness 3.356 -0.159 3.356 3.36 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.858 0.327 -0.077 -0.077 
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Table 7: Regressions to test for beta-convergence in China using equations (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3), 1978-2009 
                  
 Dependent: LP growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged labour productivity  -0.269*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.033*   -0.233*** -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.034**  
 
0.068 0.024 0.036 0.017 0.057 0.023 0.03 0.015 
Capital deepening 0.168*** 0.105*** 0.081*** 0.027**  0.154*** 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.030*** 
 
0.042 0.017 0.022 0.011 0.037 0.017 0.017 0.01 
Labour composition index 0.007** 0 0.002 0 0.006** -0.002 0.002** 0 
 
0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Public sector -0.092 -0.218*** -0.109 -0.300*** 0.024 -0.236*** -0.088 -0.244*** 
 
0.214 0.074 0.148 0.096 0.203 0.067 0.116 0.092 
Private enterprises 0.187 -0.130** 0.102 -0.181**  0.237 -0.140** 0.118 -0.162**  
 
0.16 0.066 0.12 0.078 0.15 0.058 0.094 0.077 
Birth rate -2.497** -3.980*** 1.021 -1.068 -2.450** -3.760*** 1.426* -1.548**  
 
1.123 0.859 1.096 0.7 1.01 0.845 0.851 0.658 
Openness -0.386*** 0.120** 2.090*** 0.556 -0.355*** 0.143** 1.255** 0.725**  
 
0.121 0.055 0.688 0.398 0.122 0.057 0.555 0.331 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
0.230** 0.001 0.178* 0.014 0.295*** 0.004 0.122 0.011*   
 
0.109 0.081 0.102 0.009 0.1 0.079 0.081 0.006 
Year1994 dummy -0.026 -0.005 -0.009 -0.01 -0.033* -0.001 -0.012 -0.008 
  0.02 0.015 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.012 
R-squared 0.53 0.178 0.278 0.236         
N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         132.4 68.9 104.9 72.3 
Beta -0.27 -0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.23 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 
Lambda 2.07 2.04 2.04 1.89 2.06 2.04 2.03 1.91 
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Dependent: TFP growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged TFP -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.055*** -0.124*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.048*** 
 
0.038 0.014 0.023 0.015 0.037 0.011 0.021 0.013 
Labour composition index -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Public sector 0.159 0.047 0.045 -0.092 0.176 0.021 -0.025 -0.091 
 
0.188 0.049 0.114 0.07 0.176 0.051 0.106 0.068 
Private enterprises 0.22 0.160*** 0.200** -0.012 0.254* 0.133*** 0.152* -0.042 
 
0.152 0.043 0.09 0.056 0.143 0.043 0.084 0.056 
Birth rate -2.028** -2.538*** 0.867 -1.02 -1.449* -2.204*** 1.237 -1.392**  
 
0.956 0.603 0.903 0.619 0.841 0.571 0.788 0.575 
Openness -0.154 0.081** 0.76 0.357 -0.124 0.078** 0.103 0.587**  
 
0.108 0.037 0.558 0.319 0.108 0.036 0.477 0.242 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
0.188** -0.026 0.098 0.013*   0.185** -0.009 0.056 0.009**  
 
0.092 0.058 0.087 0.008 0.088 0.056 0.074 0.004 
Year1994 dummy 0.011 -0.016 -0.009 -0.009 0.006 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 
  0.018 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.01 0.014 0.01 
R-squared 0.25 0.303 0.177 0.037         
N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         42.5 175.4 54.4 25.9 
Beta -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 
Lambda 2.03 2.03 2.03 1.99 2.03 2.03 2.03 1.98 
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Dependent: Average wages 
growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged average wages -0.039 -0.121*** -0.057** -0.058*** -0.05 -0.118*** -0.055** -0.056*** 
 
0.04 0.02 0.025 0.02 0.036 0.02 0.024 0.019 
Capital deepening -0.033 0.053*** 0.019 0.004 -0.014 0.053*** 0.016 0.002 
 
0.033 0.011 0.017 0.01 0.028 0.011 0.015 0.009 
Labour composition index 0.006** 0 0.002 -0.001 0.004* 0 0.002 -0.002 
 
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Public sector -0.43 -0.115 -0.243 -0.097 -0.356 -0.135* -0.244 -0.079 
 
0.328 0.086 0.175 0.134 0.293 0.081 0.165 0.126 
Private enterprises 0.014 0.025 -0.023 0.019 0.009 0.011 -0.033 0.048 
 
0.245 0.076 0.15 0.116 0.217 0.071 0.139 0.113 
Birth rate -1.501 -3.071*** 0.521 -2.480**  -2.453* -2.964*** 0.9 -1.626 
 
1.478 0.984 1.44 1.158 1.336 0.931 1.221 1.133 
Openness -0.257 0.118* 1.421* 1.029 -0.302* 0.107 1.263* 0.8 
 
0.169 0.066 0.855 0.624 0.164 0.072 0.761 0.572 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
0.095 0.079 -0.142 0.007 0.062 0.121 -0.16 0.007 
 
0.137 0.094 0.128 0.016 0.115 0.089 0.117 0.015 
Year1994 dummy 0.006 0.021 -0.007 0.048**  0.012 0.02 -0.005 0.047**  
  0.03 0.018 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.017 0.026 0.021 
R-squared 0.464 0.216 0.226 0.208   
   N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         98.4 94.8 69.1 70.3 
Beta no convergence -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 no convergence -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 
Lambda   2.03 1.99 1.99   2.03 1.99 1.99 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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Appendices 
Figure A1: Geographic graph of four regions in this thesis 
(1)Northeast region: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; 
(2)Coastal region: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, and Guangdong-Hainan; 
(3) Interior region: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; 
(4)West region: Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
Note: We do not study Tibet due to data limitation.
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Table A1: The location of the project 211 universities 
Coastal region 
Province Whole Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Shandong Guangdong*   
Number 63 26 4 1 10 11 1 2 3 5   
Percentage 56% 23% 3% 1% 9% 10% 1% 2% 3% 4%   
Northeast region 
Province Whole Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang               
Number 12 4 3 5               
Percentage 10% 3% 3% 4%               
Middle region 
Province Whole Shanxi Anhui Jiangxi Henan Hubei Hunan         
Number 16 1 3 1 1 7 3         
Percentage 15% 1% 3% 1% 1% 6% 3%         
West region 
Province Whole Inner Mongolia Guangxi Sichuan* Guizhou Yunnan Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang 
Number 24 1 1 7 1 1 8 1 1 1 2 
Percentage 22% 1% 1% 6% 1% 1% 7% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Note: Project 211 is a project of National Key Universities and colleges initiated in 1995 by the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, with 
the intent of raising the research standards of high-level universities and cultivating strategies for socio-economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
